Of Dutch or German Ancestry?
Mennonite Refugees, MCC, and the International Refugee Organization

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Introduction:

World War II left millions of refugees in Europe, many of whom were unable or unwilling to return to their home country.\(^1\) Approximately 12,000 Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union had survived the war and post-war repatriations and remained in those portions of Germany and Austria occupied by the western allies. An additional 2,000 refugees from former Prussian, Danzig and northern Polish territories were housed in refugee camps in Denmark or in Schleswig-Holstein.\(^2\) The refugees from the Soviet Union knew that a terrible fate awaited them if they returned, voluntarily or otherwise, to their old homeland. The post-war Polish government, on the other hand, would not permit the return of German or Mennonite citizens.\(^3\)

The long-term economic prospects of these refugees in war-ravaged Europe was bleak. Most depended for their immediate livelihood on relief supplies provided by military, United Nations, or voluntary agencies. Emigration to North or South America offered the only reasonable hope of economic and personal rehabilitation. United Nations relief and rehabilitation agencies, however, only had a mandate to assist refugees coming from one of the United Nations. That effectively disqualified the refugees from Danzig, East and West

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Prussia and northern Poland who were all regarded and treated as German nationals. The refugees from the Soviet Union were, of course, citizens of one of the United Nations, but they faced other desperate problems.

The western allies had agreed during the last months of the war that allied citizens should be repatriated, by force if necessary, after the war. Stalin had been particularly insistent on this point at the conferences at Yalta and Tehran. During the first seven months after Germany's unconditional surrender the policy of involuntary repatriation of Soviet refugees was rigorously enforced, but the atrocities associated with post-war involuntary repatriations led to a change of policy. Senior American military officers were informed of the change in January of 1946. They were still asked to try and persuade as many of the refugees from the Soviet Union as possible to return. Soviet repatriation officers would still be granted full access to the refugee camps, but involuntary repatriation was only to take place in cases where the Soviets provided conclusive proof that the individual concerned had voluntarily collaborated with the enemy. Where such evidence was not forthcoming there would not be an involuntary repatriation. The refugees, however, were not informed of this change of policy and continued to live in fear of involuntary repatriation long after the policy had been abandoned.

The Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union thus faced a dilemma. To obtain the United Nations assistance and support they desperately needed for their immediate survival and expeditious emigration to North or South America it was necessary that they be recognized as citizens of one of the United Nations. Yet, if they admitted that they had been citizens of the Soviet Union when the war broke out, they risked, or at least believed they risked, the terrible danger of involuntary repatriation back to the Soviet Union. Faced with these dangers, the refugees, aided and abetted by senior MCC officials, advanced a claim that they were really persons of Dutch ancestry and should be given United Nations assistance on that basis. This claim of Dutch ancestry was never officially accepted by the various United Nations agencies, but the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union received relief and emigration assistance from the United Nations.

Several Nations officials, particularly in the International Refugee Organization, became suspicious about these German-speaking refugees who had been evacuated westward under the protection of the retreating German forces. Almost all had accepted German citizenship, and many had served in German military, police and political units. MCC officials argued that the refugees had only done this under duress. They had become German citizens to avoid forced repatriation, and collaborated with the enemy only because their lives were in danger if they did not do so.

New evidence, drawn mainly from captured German documents, contradicted some of the claims made by the refugees and by MCC officials. It led to serious disputes with senior officials of the International Refugee Organization in which senior MCC officials used their excellent diplomatic contacts with
strategic American State Department officials to combat demands that Men-
nonite refugees from the Soviet Union be declared ineligible for United
Nations, including IRO, emigration assistance.

Precedents

The fight to establish and safeguard the eligibility of the refugees from the
Soviet Union for United Nations, and specifically International Refugee Or-
ganization, assistance was led by C. F. Klassen, MCC’s senior European officer,
and by William T. Snyder who was a senior MCC administrator at its head office
in Akron, Pennsylvania. Klassen and his family had emigrated from the Soviet
Union to Canada in the mid-1920s. That migration had been expedited by a
Mennonite organization in the Soviet Union which called itself the Verband der
Buerger hollaendischer Herkunft (Union of Citizens of Dutch Ancestry). This
Union had stressed that the Mennonites living in the Soviet Union were not of
German, but rather of Dutch ancestry, and more than 22,000 were able to
emigrate to Canada in the 1920s, thanks in large part to the efforts of the
Verband.

C. F. Klassen had been involved in a peripheral way in the Mennonite
migrations of the 1920s. He was greatly impressed when, in 1945, a small
group of Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union persuaded Dutch authorities that they were people of Dutch ancestry and were granted entry into the Netherlands on that basis. Others quickly followed, and an estimated 420 Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union were admitted by the Dutch authorities. The Low-German dialect spoken by the refugees proved persuasive with the Dutch border guards. But when the Soviets heard about this, they brusquely informed the Dutch government that no more Dutch prisoners of war, formerly held by the Germans in territories occupied by Soviet troops after the war, would be repatriated to the Netherlands if the Dutch authorities continued to recognize the claims of Dutch ancestry and granted entry to Mennonite refugees who had lived in Russia and the Soviet Union for more than 150 years. Not surprisingly, the Dutch authorities closed their borders to all Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union, at least until all Dutch prisoners of war liberated by Soviet troops were safely returned to their homes. A Soviet demand that the Dutch government also return those Mennonite refugees already in Holland was thwarted by Dutch insistence that Soviet repatriation officers provide proof of identity and citizenship of these people and of their voluntary collaboration with the enemy. That the Soviet repatriation officers could not do, and those already admitted to Holland remained there and became eligible for IRO emigration assistance.

The tough stand taken by the Soviets meant that other Mennonite refugees could not look to Holland as a place of refuge or as a possible new homeland. The Mennonite Central Committee, nevertheless, in 1947, established its largest refugee camp and many of its European administrative and records-keeping operations at Gronau near the Dutch/German border. The Gronau camp was equipped to feed and shelter between 500 and 900 refugees, but occasionally held as many as 2,000 people. The needed buildings were requisitioned by the British military, and repaired and made habitable by MCC workers. Thousands of refugees were fed, housed, and given medical care. Schools were established, as were Bible study groups and church services for the adults. Nine large buildings eventually comprised the camp.

A second MCC-administered refugee camp, Lager Backnang, was established near Stuttgart in June of 1947. This camp also had its origin in attempts by Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union to gain entry into Holland. In this case 315 refugees in the Munich region boarded a train which was to take them through France and Belgium and on to Holland. The train was stopped at the Dutch border on 2 March 1947, and the refugees were denied entry. They were then taken back to Munich, but as Soviet citizens refusing repatriation they were refused food and supplies at the United Nations refugee camps. Their desperate plight led to the established of an MCC camp at Backnang which accommodated approximately 600 refugees and also became a major transit point for emigrants eager to go to Canada or Paraguay. Other camps were established later by MCC as need and opportunity arose.

These MCC camps and relief programs met immediate needs, but only
emigration offered long-term solutions. Canada, where many of the Mennonite refugees had friends and family members, was the preferred destination. Emigration could be expedited or delayed, depending on the national status of the refugees. All the western governments were under tremendous pressure to accept refugees who were entitled to assistance from the United Nations agencies.

Four agencies of the old League of Nations or of the recently organized United Nations were particularly important in the assessment and review of Mennonite relief and rehabilitation entitlements. They were, more or less in chronological order, the Inter-Governmental Commission for refugees (IGCR), the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO), and the International Refugee Organization (IRO).

The mandate of all these organizations was to look after displaced persons and refugees who were citizens of one of the United Nations. The Soviet Union was, of course, a member of the United Nations, but argued successfully that Soviet citizens who refused repatriation should not be eligible for United Nations assistance.

Refugees ineligible for United Nations assistance faced two problems. First, they had to rely on very hard pressed local governments, or on charitable organizations, to meet their immediate needs. Second, all the early medical examinations, political screenings, interviews and other arrangements for emigration were conducted in UNRRA, PCIRO or IRO camps, and the transportation costs of eligible emigrants from their point of departure in Europe to the point of debarkation in their new homeland were covered by the IRO or its predecessor agencies. Emigration screenings and transportation costs created enormous obstacles for those not eligible for United Nations assistance.

The pronouncement of “eligibility” or “ineligibility” is of far-reaching importance. If you are declared to be eligible, you have certain rights and privileges under IRO; if you are declared ineligible you have no rights under IRO. The ineligible ones cannot be processed by IRO officials. They are denied access to IRO camps for medical and political screening; they cannot ride military or CCG trains; they cannot leave Germany and cross an International Boundary. They are not entitled to the same food rations of D.P.s eligible under IRO.

The rules and interpretations regarding eligibility for United Nations and IRO assistance were drawn up to deal with people who found themselves in complex and difficult situations. Those trying to help the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union sometimes had contradictory or incomplete information, and they had to work in an environment where political and diplomatic considerations often took precedence over legal niceties. The resulting uncertainty was exploited by MCC leaders, most notably C. F. Klassen, in ways which were of great benefit to the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union.

Several IRO administrators familiar with the wartime experiences and activities of the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union were convinced
that these refugees were in fact Volksdeutsche, and that many of them had collaborated voluntarily with the enemy. The Mennonite refugees seemed virtually indistinguishable from the thousands of other Soviet Germans who had also been evacuated by the retreating Germans and who were regarded as being outside the mandate of the IRO. IRO administrators consequently voiced serious doubts and harboured deep suspicions regarding the honesty and legitimacy of the MCC itself when it insisted that the refugees were people of Dutch ancestry entitled to IRO assistance.17

C. F. Klassen handled most of the early negotiations with League and United Nations officials in Geneva and with local relief administrators. He and other MCC officials from Akron enjoyed friendly relations with senior officials in the U. S. State Department and in the IRO's Washington Bureau. The generous donations for post-war relief work given by MCC, and their constructive role in the Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operations in Germany (CRALOG) helped create good will and gain influential friends who were sympathetic to the unique and difficult situation of the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union. In 1947, for example, a State Department official wrote as follows to C. F. Klassen:

Conscious of the fine record of the Mennonite Central Committee, and of its efforts to move as many Mennonites as possible from Europe to countries overseas, I have given very careful consideration to your letter of 18th September in which you ask PCIRO to grant financial assistance to your Committee in moving 2,000 Mennonites to Paraguay.18

In Europe Klassen established harmonious working relations with the most senior officers of the IGCR, UNRRA, PCIRO and then, after the specified minimum number of countries had ratified participation, with senior officials of the IRO.19 With the help of these influential friends, Klassen was able to have many of the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union admitted into UNRRA camps. He conducted vigorous negotiations to obtain some sort of special status for the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union, comparable to the special status granted stateless Jews by the Intergovernmental Commission for Refugees or to stateless persons who had been issued so-called “Nansen” passes during the inter-war period. Unofficial and invalid “Menno Passes” were in fact issued by some MCC officials which, to the surprise of many, were honoured by the railways, by some German government officials, and occasionally by relief administrators. But the kind of special stateless status for Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union, which was implied through the issuance of these passes, was never officially recognized.

In their early official submissions MCC officials made two basic points.20 The first was that almost all the family names of the refugees from the Soviet Union could be traced back to the Netherlands. The second point emphasized that the refugees from the Soviet Union had never become fully integrated into either the Prussian or the Russian/Soviet culture and society. Indeed, they had suffered such harsh treatment in Prussia that they had emigrated to Russia, where they had again been subjected to cruel persecution.21
The Intergovernmental Commission on Refugees established a small commission to examine the claims made on behalf of the Soviet Mennonites, but initially did not find the arguments persuasive. Then a recently completed doctoral dissertation by Horst Penner on the settlement of Dutch Mennonites in the Vistula and Nogat lowlands came to the attention of MCC officials. Penner had included in his dissertation an appendix in which the family names of the Dutch settlers were given. Roughly ninety percent of the family names of the refugees from the Soviet Union appeared in Penner’s appendix. That evidence, together with extensive historical documentation compiled by Benjamin H. Unruh, who did not himself agree with the “Dutch ancestry” arguments but allowed his work to be cited in support of those claims, proved persuasive. The IGCR agreed that Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union could be admitted to UNRRA and later IRO camps, and that they would also be eligible for financial assistance which would pay the cost of moving emigrants from Europe to their point of disembarkation in the country to which they were emigrating. Expenses associated with the chartering of the ship Volendam to take the Berlin refugees to Paraguay in February of 1947, totalling $160,000, were the first such costs incurred by Mennonite emigrants and paid by the IGCR. This paved the way for the payment of transportation costs of approximately 500 Mennonite emigrants going to Canada in 1947, and of two further transports to Paraguay by the PCIRO or the IRO.

In a report published in October of 1948 C. F. Klassen spoke of the excellent and cordial relations he had established with officials of the newly organized IRO in both Geneva and Washington. He noted that the IRO Director General, W. Hallam Tuck, was a God-fearing and well meaning person, and that relations with the IRO Bureau were absolutely friendly. But not everyone was persuaded that the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union were eligible for United Nations assistance, while all the other Soviet Germans who had also been evacuated by the retreating Germans were not eligible for IRO assistance. Several Jewish, Ukrainian and American officials and researchers questioned the validity of the Mennonite claim of Dutch ancestry. The publicity surrounding the rescue in January and February of 1947 of the refugees trapped in Berlin brought the entire issue back into the spotlight. The Soviet Union issued an official note of protest, to which American State Department officials responded coolly and correctly, but they also commissioned a distinguished historian, Morton Royse, to undertake a thorough study of the ethnic origins and political orientation of the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union. Royse concluded that the Mennonite refugees were ethnic Germans or Volksdeutsche, irrespective of their distant ancestry. They had behaved and been recognized by the Nazis as Volksdeutsche during the war, and Royse’s conclusion was clear.

A doubtful origin, dating back several centuries, cannot change the character of the present generation, which was German and so recognized by themselves and others. These people, of the present generation, are Volksdeutsche or members of the German minority, in all ethnic aspects and mentality, regardless of what.
historical claims they may have to an obscure remote ancestry.²⁸

George L. Warren, the American State Department’s Advisor on Refugees and Displaced Persons, had a good working relationship with senior MCC officials. He showed them Royse’s report and invited them to respond and, if possible, refute Royse’s findings. The ensuing MCC defence took two forms. First a determined effort was made to reinforce the historic claims of Mennonite Dutch ancestry. Cornelius Krahn, a professor of Mennonite History at Bethel College in Newton, Kansas, was asked to prepare a comprehensive and thoroughly documented research paper on the subject.²⁹ Krahn duly prepared a thirty-page brief, together with additional pages of bibliographic references and excerpts from key documents, which was presented to State Department officials on 6 April 1948, and subsequently filed with the IRO office in Geneva.³⁰

C. F. Klassen handled the negotiations in Geneva regarding Mennonite eligibility for IRO assistance, and also intervened elsewhere in Europe when, in Klassen’s opinion, other MCC administrators “met with too stiff an opposition or had to deal with too stupid eligibility officers.”³¹ He nevertheless regarded these encounters as battles on the periphery, prompted by local jealousies and waged by junior officials who preferred to be “the first in the village rather than the last in the city.”³²

The IRO never officially accepted the Dutch ancestry argument, but throughout 1948 Mennonite refugees were admitted into UNRRA or IRO camps and the PCIRO or the IRO paid transportation costs of those emigrating to Canada or South America. Klassen thus achieved a practical victory - the refugees were treated as if they were eligible for relief and other assistance under the IRO mandate.

A Nasty Fight

The victories of 1948 had barely been won when new and much more serious evidence of Mennonite collaboration with the Nazi occupation forces came to light. Specifically, IRO officials were furnished documentary proof that some of the refugees from the Soviet Union had voluntarily requested German citizenship as early as 1942, and that others had voluntarily joined German military units when there was no compulsion for them to do so. Such actions would clearly place these refugees, along with most other Volksdeutsche refugees, outside the mandate of the IRO and of other United Nations relief and rehabilitation agencies.³³

There was no dispute about the fact that virtually all the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union had, at one time or another, been sworn in as German citizens, the majority at the time when they were resettled temporarily in the Wartheigau region of central Poland. A significant number had also served in various German military units, including the S.S. and the Sicherheitsdienst.
MCC officials insisted that, with very few exceptions, these people had only accepted German citizenship or served in the German military because they had been drafted, placed under duress by the occupation forces, or because they regarded German citizenship as a way to protect themselves against involuntary repatriation. Consequently, in all the earlier documentation MCC officials had given to IRO officials, no mention had been made of German military service, acceptance of German citizenship or other forms of collaboration with the enemy. An MCC official explained that “We accorded no validity to the naturalization of our Mennonites during World War II inasmuch as such was taken in a situation of duress.”

New evidence that the Mennonite refugees had collaborated voluntarily with the German occupation forces, and that some had joined German military units or requested German citizenship when they were not under duress, was found late in 1948 and in 1949 in the huge Berlin Document Centre which had been set up by the Organization for the Military Government of Germany (United States) to house captured German documents. Those documents included the extensive registry or Karteisystem on all ethnic Germans in the eastern-occupied territories, compiled by the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle at its offices in Litzmannstadt. Junior IRO officials, already suspicious about the wartime loyalties of the Mennonite refugees and their claims of Dutch ancestry after the war, used this new information to challenge the IRO eligibility of 21, later of 43 Mennonite refugees on the basis of their wartime activities. That was obviously a serious blow for those involved. Even more serious was that fact that it placed in question the eligibility of all Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union. Some IRO officials became convinced that MCC officials had deliberately withheld important information regarding voluntary military service and collaboration by many of the refugees, in order to obtain IRO support for refugees who did not qualify for such assistance. That was emphatically denied by MCC officials, but the result was the issuance, on 23 July 1949, of a new IRO order dealing specifically with the disputed eligibility of Mennonite refugees. Any Mennonite refugee who had accepted or acknowledged German citizenship with the German Einwohnermeldedienst, which almost all the Mennonite refugees had done, was declared ineligible for IRO assistance unless a review of the relevant information in the Berlin Document Centre proved that he or she had only done so under duress, and had not voluntarily collaborated with the enemy. If the terms of this order had stood, the onus of proof that he or she had acted only under duress would rest with the refugee.

William Snyder and C. F. Klassen immediately prepared a lengthy response which spoke of Mennonites being drafted to serve in the German military, of Mennonites being unknowingly and en masse sworn in as German citizens at the time of their resettlement in the Warthegau, and of others who requested German citizenship or had simply declared that they were German citizens because they believed that would make it possible for them to escape Soviet repatriation officers. They insisted, emphatically, that the Mennonite refugees from the
Soviet Union were not Volksdeutsche, but "a people unmistakably other than German," who had registered as Germans "exclusively and only in order that they might protect themselves from the Bolshevik agents who are active everywhere ... they... resorted to an untruth to save their lives."\(^{40}\)

In Washington MCC officials from the Akron office contacted George Warren, their friend and confidant in the State Department, who exerted his influence to have the IRO order of 23 July 1949 revoked or modified.\(^ {41}\) The Canadian government was also kept informed of developments by MCC officials because most of the refugees involved hoped to emigrate to Canada. IRO eligibility, however, was not a major concern for the Canadian government.\(^ {42}\) While making appropriate representations in support of the Mennonites to the IRO, expressing the hope that the Mennonite refugees would be treated fairly, Canadian External Affairs officials cautioned that:

the qualifications for eligibility under the mandate are exactly the same for Mennonites as for others and under such circumstances, the Department would have no sound ground on which to object to the recent directive.\(^ {43}\)

What seems clear from the official Canadian correspondence is that the loss of IRO eligibility would not automatically disqualify the Mennonite refugees as prospective immigrants to Canada. Canadian officials, at the urging of the Canadian Pacific Railway, were, in fact, willing to classify the Mennonite Camp at Gronau as an immigration screening centre if there were serious delays or difficulties at the IRO camps. The Canadian government wanted to attract immigrants who could be readily absorbed into Canadian economic, social and cultural life. "Absorptive capacity," not IRO eligibility or dubious wartime activities, were the overriding concern. The loss of IRO eligibility would have resulted in further irritating bureaucratic delays, and it would greatly increase the financial costs for which the Mennonite Central Committee or the Canadian Board of Colonization would have become responsible. It would not, however, close the door to Mennonite immigration to Canada, and it would have placed all the Mennonite refugees, including those from Prussia, Danzig and northern Poland on the same footing.\(^ {44}\)

Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization and MCC officials, fearing the possible loss of IRO eligibility, participated with Lutheran and other religious organizations in the establishment of a Canadian Council for Resettlement of Refugees Outside the IRO Mandate (CCCRR).\(^ {45}\) But they only did so in a half-hearted way, hoping and expecting that the refugees from the Soviet Union would be able to come to Canada with IRO assistance. They would use the CCCRR for Mennonite refugees who were declared ineligible for IRO assistance but the priority was to get as many of the refugees from the Soviet Union as possible into Canada with IRO support.

In their efforts to retain IRO eligibility MCC and American state department officials exerted a great deal of pressure on the IRO, and in October of 1949 the troublesome IRO order of 23 July was withdrawn and another issued which once
again granted IRO eligibility to these refugees unless there was evidence of voluntary collaboration with the enemy. All Mennonite cases, however, still had to be referred to the Berlin Document Centre for clearance. Documentation provided by MCC officials alone was not sufficient.

The eligibility fight created much animosity on both sides. IRO officials, particularly some of the more junior officers coming from minority groups which had suffered greatly at the hands of the Germans, were deeply suspicious about the wartime activities of people who spoke German and had been evacuated under the protection of the German military. Senior IRO officials, more susceptible to diplomatic pressure from Washington, understood the unique and difficult situation of the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union, but feared that the acceptance of the Mennonite claims would force the IRO also to recognize similar claims by German refugees from the Baltic States and from the Black Sea area, and by large groups of Ukrainians, Poles and others. "Thus aid to 1,500 Mennonites might open the door to 150,000 others so far excluded from IRO protection."  

The IRO eligibility dispute churned up some venomous charges and counter charges. C. F. Klassen at one point stated bitterly that he had waged "an honest fight against ignorance, prejudice, stupidity, and not seldom, even wickedness of IRO officers." He was particularly critical of some of the Jewish people who worked in the IRO, and heatedly denied all suggestions that MCC had deliberately withheld vital information regarding wartime collaboration of the Mennonite refugees with the enemy occupation forces.

The facts of the case, as they are known now, lend some credence to both sides. MCC officials, mainly under the direction of Peter J. Dyck, who was C. F. Klassen's brother-in-law, established their own registry of Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union. That large registry was maintained and continuously updated at the Gronau camp. It did not include information about military service, the time, place and circumstance under which German citizenship had been acquired, or other information pertaining to possible collaboration with the German occupation forces. MCC leaders therefore did not know officially, and probably did not wish to know, such things. Duress or voluntary collaboration in conditions of war were themselves flexible terms, but the critical material allegedly withheld by MCC officials was not available in their own records. That, however, did not alter the fact that there was damaging and compromising information about Mennonite wartime collaboration with the German occupation forces during the war, in the captured German documents housed in the Berlin Document Centre. That evidence, at least in some cases, refuted MCC claims that such collaboration had taken place only under duress.

The hard facts of the case were that IRO researchers and officials were closer to the truth as revealed in the surviving captured German documents than the disclaimers in the various MCC documents. Klassen, Snyder and their associates, however, did not deliberately withhold information available in their files, and their position more accurately expressed the emotional and spiritual state of
the refugees. These people had suffered much under Soviet rule, and for a time saw the Germans as God’s instrument to free them from Soviet tyranny. The desperate fear of Soviet capture or repatriation became the overriding emotion during the last stages of the war and the immediate post-war period. The cold and impersonal classifications of the military occupation forces, or of the IRO, did not fit or take into account their tragic situation and their particular experiences. It did not recognize the desperate fears and terrors which dominated virtually everything they did and said while their status and prospects remained in doubt.50

The IRO eligibility controversy flared up once more when the official history of the IRO was being written. The author, using reports based on information drawn from the official IRO records and from the Berlin Document Centre, was sharply critical of MCC. Before the work was published, however, George L. Warren, the MCC’s friend and advocate at the American State Department, showed a copy of the page proofs to William T. Snyder, the senior MCC official in the Akron office. Snyder sent the material to C. F. Klassen who responded with a lengthy explanation of those events. He argued that publication of the material as written would constitute “another case of ill will where a small minority is being treated criminally,” and recommended that “the author of this chapter... take a well meant advice and change this chapter or drop it altogether, because a later historian must willy-nilly come to the conclusion that IRO officials who dealt with Mennonite eligibility were poor suckers.”51

Klassen insisted that he had no regrets whatever for the way in which he had handled the eligibility problem. “I prayed and fought for the eligibility of our refugees. The results were gratifying because I took them as answers to my prayers and the prayers of others.”52

William Snyder, in his response to George Warren, denounced the entire section on the Mennonites in the draft IRO history which, he argued, “is built on the foundation that the Mennonites helped by IRO were not eligible for that help and that the Mennonite Central Committee was part of a diabolical scheme to withhold information from IRO officials.” Snyder admitted that “The facts used in this section sometimes apply to a few people,” but complained that “a conclusion is drawn that it applies to all the people.” He again reiterated that Mennonites from the Soviet Union who had served in the German army, the Waffen S. S., the Sicherheitsdienst, joined the Nazi party, or accepted German citizenship, had only done so under compulsion or duress. He knew that the Berlin documents showed that some of the refugees themselves had admitted that they had not been under duress when they had done the above-mentioned things, but argued that “some may have replied thus, but this is not conclusive proof that they considered themselves German ethnically.”53

Any examination of the relevant German records, particularly those of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and of the Reichsministerium fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete, makes it absolutely clear that the Germans regarded and treated the Mennonites in the occupied portions of the Soviet Union as ethnic Germans or Volksdeutsche. It is also clear from the writing of many of the refugees that they
too thought of themselves as *Volksdeutsche* during the war, and particularly during their evacuation from the Soviet Union under German military protection. They were not enthusiastic supporters of Soviet communism, and most obviously did not regard the Red Army or the prospect of repatriation with enthusiasm.\(^{54}\) Jacob A. Neufeld, one of the refugees and also a brother-in-law of the Chairman of the Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization, kept a detailed diary in which he chronicled the experiences of his people. He probably expressed quite accurately the sentiments and attitudes of the refugees. His attitude, like that of others, was rooted in his people’s cruel and tragic experiences under Soviet and communist governance. Just before Germany’s unconditional surrender he wrote:

> If the Russians overrun Europe, we Russian refugees and many others are finished. We cannot imagine what that would mean, and no one is willing even to contemplate such a disaster, and so they continue to believe, suffer, fight and work, as if possessed. Thus far the German leaders have accomplished remarkable things. Many difficult victories have been won by the brave soldiers, many difficult situations have been mastered, and now, should they fail in the end after so many years of desperate economic and military struggle? No! No! Surely that cannot be!...May the merciful God in heaven, the arbiter of history, bring everything to a good end.\(^{55}\)

Such sentiments could be, and were, interpreted as confirming both the claims made by both the IRO and MCC officials, even though those respective claims seemed completely contradictory.

### Conclusion

The eligibility fight created much tension, but in the end, thanks largely to effective intervention by American State Department officials who were impressed and grateful for the massive relief and rehabilitation activities of MCC, almost all the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union who met appropriate political and medical standards, were able to migrate from Europe to North or South America with support and assistance from the IRO or one of its predecessor agencies. Only so-called “hard-core” cases created serious problems.\(^{56}\) That meant that the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union were given priority by MCC and Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization officials over the Mennonite refugees from Prussia, Danzig and northern Poland. It also meant that the migration of the 1940s, unlike that of the 1920s, would not leave Canadian Mennonites with another transportation debt or *Reiseschuld* hangover.

Mennonites have been inclined to regard truth and honesty as absolute values. The eligibility fight demonstrates that even these cherished values may appear differently to people in complex, difficult and morally ambiguous situations. Just before the major controversies with the IRO arose, C. F. Klassen wrote that “IRO has helped us much and whoever is destined to write the history of our refugee work will need to give a large place in it to the IRO.”\(^{57}\) Klassen did not anticipate, at that time, his subsequent bitter disputes with IRO officials.
Those disputes make it necessary for later historians to provide a better, and perhaps somewhat different, understanding and interpretation of the roles of both the IRO and the MCC in the post-World War II migration of 7,698 Mennonite refugee immigrants from Europe to Canada after World War II.

Notes

1 There were some estimates that there were as many as 40,475,000 civilian refugees and displaced persons in Europe immediately after the war. American military officials, however, stated that the number had been reduced to 2,000,000 by the end of September of 1945. Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees, 1939-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movements (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), and Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (London: George Allen and Irwin, 1953). Precise definitions of who was, and who was not, a refugee or a Displaced Person are found in United States National Archives (USNA), Record Group 260 (RG 260), Organization for the Military Government of Germany, United States (OMGUS), Adjutant General’s Office (AGO), Decimal File 383.7, 1945-46, Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons (All Operations), June 3, 1944.

2 Weierhof Mennonitische Forschungsstelle, Archival Box labelled “Hilfswerk II HVDM Anfaenge 1946-1950,” A. Braun, treasurer of the Hilfswerk der Vereinigung der Deutschen Mennonitengemeinden, an “Liebe Brueder,” 13 Dec. 1946. Other sources give somewhat different estimates, but a total of 11,766 Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union registered with the Mennonite Central Committee up to June of 1948. The estimate that approximately 12,000 Mennonites from the Soviet Union remained in the west after September of 1945 therefore seems reasonable, since there were good reasons for all Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union, except those captured in German military uniform or who were known as former SS or other elite Nazi units, to register with the MCC.


The story of this original group of Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union who gained admission to Holland on the strength of their claim that they were of Dutch ancestry is told in vivid and colourful detail in Dyck, *Up From the Rubble*, ch. 4, “The First Thirty-three.”

Siegfried Janzen, “Das Fluechtlingslager Gronau,” *Der Mennonit*, 1 Jahrgang (Juli/August 1948), p. 52-3, 64.


A brief outline of the various agencies involved in refugee relief and rehabilitation work, together with a brief description of the responsibilities of each, is given in Mennonite Heritage Centre (MHC), Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization (Board of Colonization) 1350/1121, *Forty Years of International Assistance to Refugees* (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d.).


The classifications of refugees and displaced persons changed over the years, but MCC officials quickly realized that the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union did not fit easily into any of the categories established by the allied forces. The early categories are all listed and explained in USNA RG 260, OMGUS, AGO Decimal File 383.7, 1945-46, “Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons (All Operations), 3 June 1944.”

C. F. Klassen’s recollections of these negotiations are given in Klassen, *Ambassador to His People*, p. 187-88. A somewhat different and less charitable account is given in Archive Nationale, Paris, International Refugee Organization Records, Box 49, File entitled “Eligibility of Mennonites, 1946-47,” and Box 59, “Activities report for December 1946 of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, British Zone, Germany.


The PCIRO and the IRO were really the same organization. The charter of the IRO only
became valid after a predetermined number of countries had ratified it. Until that happened, the organization operated as the PCIRO.


32Klassen, Ambassador, p. 187-89.


34MCC paid the cost of resettling the refugees in Paraguay. In October of 1947 they had spent $560,000.00 resettling the first Volendam boatload of people, and estimated that another $350,000.00 would be needed for those people. Those going to Paraguay later also had to be resettled at MCC cost. The refugees coming to Canada, after that became possible, were looked after by Canadian sponsors after their arrival. MCA MCC Records IX 6-3 File entitled “MCC Corresp., 1947. U. S. Dept. of State,” William T. Snyder to George L. Warren, 8 October 1947.


36A copy of the report by Lt. Col. Wm. Stinson to Col. B. L. Milburn providing a detailed account of the evacuation, together with special reports filed Robert Kreider, Marie Brunk and Magdalen Friesen and the several reports published in New York newspapers are available in MCA MCC Records IX 12-1 MCC Collection Report Files, “Volendam, S.S., Refugee Movement, 1947.”


38As quoted in MHC Board of Colonization 132/5957, William T. Snyder to Cornelius Krahn, 12 March 1948.

39Ibid.


41Ibid., C. F. Klassen to William Snyder, 28 January 1953.

42C. F. Klassen, “Die mennonitischen Fluechtlinge und wir,” Der Mennonit, 1 Jahrgang (September/Oktber 1948), p. 85-86. See particularly the section under the sub-heading “I.R.O. und wir.”

43The records of the International Refugee Organization are now at the Archive Nationale in Paris. The finding aid has reference to a number of files, but an examination of the relevant boxes themselves proved disappointing. A number of the key documents were no longer in those files, and it became necessary to reconstruct from copies available in the records of the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration at the National Archives in Ottawa, the records of the Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization at the Mennonite Heritage Centre in Winnipeg, the records of the Mennonite Central Committee at the Archives of the Mennonite Church in Goshen,
Indiana, and the records of the American State Department in Washington. The relevant IRO files, as identified in the Finding Aid at the Archive Nationale in Paris are Box 49, File entitled “Eligibility of Mennonites, 1946-47”; Ibid., Box 556, Confidential Files on Mennonites; Ibid., Box 571, “Refugees - Mennonites, fevrier 1947-juillet 1949; Ibid., Box 572, “Refugees - Volksdeutsche, juillet 1947-aout 1951. An additional IRO file of interest is Ibid., Box 1170, “Paraguay correspondence.” Copies of the several IRO orders related to the Mennonite refugees from the Soviet Union, and relevant correspondence including copies of the various documents filed by the Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization and the Mennonite Central Committee are available in NAC RG 76, Vol. 855, File 554-22.

The problem with this claim was that a legal or official threat of involuntary repatriation sanctioned by the western allies only arose after the Yalta, Tehran and Potsdam conferences, all held in 1945. Almost all the Mennonite refugees had sought or accepted German citizenship earlier, in some cases as early as 1942.


In conversation with Peter J. Dyck and William T. Snyder in 1993 I was again told, unequivocally, that MCC had not withheld any relevant information available in their files. When Peter J. Dyck and others set up the MCC Kartei at the Gronau camp they did not inquire about possible wartime collaboration by the refugees, choosing instead to believe that the refugees had only collaborated under duress—an imprecise and flexible terms.

A copy of this order is available in NAC RG 76, Vol. 855, File 554-22.

William Snyder to A. L. Joliffe, Director of Immigration, Dominion of Canada, 16 September 1949. Underlined in the original.

MCA MCC Records IX 6-3, File entitled “Correspondence 1950, United States Government Department of State.” William T. Snyder to George L. Warren, 14 June 1950. The matter became critical in 1950 because the United States refused to admit some of the prospective immigrants on the basis of the earlier reports. Those rejected by United States immigration authorities also lost their IRO eligibility.


MCC officials first addressed the needs of the refugees from the Soviet Union, most of whom received IRO, PCIRO and UNRRA assistance. In 1950 they began serious negotiations for the emigration of expelled Mennonites from the former Free State of Danzig and adjacent Prussian/Polish territories. The Danzig/Polish/Prussian Mennonites had the same ethnic back-
ground as those from the Soviet Union, but no claim of Dutch ancestry was ever advanced on their behalf. The support these people had given to the Third Reich made such a claim impolitic. But by late 1949 both Latin American and Canadian immigration officials were willing to admit some of the "expellees." In a curious letter to George L. Warren, William T. Snyder referred to 6,000 to 8,000 "Mennonites from the Free State of Danzig who are now in Western Germany." None of the other German Mennonite, MCC or German documents suggest there were anywhere near that many Danzig Mennonites. MCA MCC Records, File entitled "Correspondence 1950, United States Government, Department of State," William T. Snyder to George L. Warren, 22 September 1950. An earlier MCC letter, also signed by Snyder, suggested that the total number of Mennonite expellees for Danzig, Prussia and Poland, was approximately 5,000. Ibid., File entitled "United States Government, (Department of) State, 1948, William T. Snyder to George L. Warren, 13 July 1948.

\[^{26}\]MHC Board of Colonization 1329/988, Report of Meeting Held in Ottawa, Monday, June 23rd, 1947, to organize a joint mission to handle refugees or displaced persons not coming within the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees or the International Refugee Organization; and Copy of Minutes of Meeting of Canadian Christian Council for Resettlement of Refugees (Outside the Mandate of IRO) held on Monday, 20 October 1947, at 4:00 p.m. in the Royal Alexandra Hotel, Winnipeg, Manitoba; and Ibid., 1330/989, Canadian Christian Council for Resettlement of Refugees (Outside the Mandate of the I.R.O.), A Brief History. Canadian Church agencies involved in the CCCRR were the Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Canadian Lutheran World Relief, the Catholic Immigrant Aid Society, the Sudeten Committee, the German Baptist Colonization and Immigration, the Baptist Convention of Ontario and Quebec, the Church World Service of the Lutheran World Federation, the Emergency Planning Council, and the Latvian Relief Fund of Canada. The first meetings were convened on the initiative of Canadian Pacific Railway and Canadian National Railways immigration and colonization officers.

\[^{27}\]Copies of the relevant IRO orders are in Ibid, 1325/957 and in NAC RG 76, Vol. 855, File 554-22.


\[^{29}\]MHC Board of Colonization 1325/957, C. F. Klassen to William T. Snyder, 28 January 1953.

\[^{30}\]In 1993 I discussed, in detail, with Peter and Elfrieda Dyck and William T. Snyder, the manner in which this Kartei was created and the kind of information it contained, and have also examined many of the cards themselves.

It is a fact that Soviet repatriation officers had to be granted access to the refugee camps, and if those repatriation officers could find proof that a refugee had collaborated voluntarily with the enemy that individual would be forcibly repatriated.

In the correspondence, I have seen several letters in which refugees expressed great concern when they thought they may have given information to interrogators that might prove damaging. A few have told me personally that while they had given damaging personal information to MCC officials, they were confident that such information had not been placed on any official record available to Soviet repatriation officers or to officials of the International Refugee Organization.

\[^{31}\]MCC officials, in an effort to strengthen the credibility of statements made and briefs prepared by C. F. Klassen, emphasized that Klassen was himself of resident of South Russia until 1927 and that "he knows better than perhaps any other MCC official the mind of these Mennonite refugees and also their experiences between the two World Wars." MCA MCC Records IX 6-3 File entitled "United States Government (Department of) State, 1948, William T. Snyder to Lawrence A. Dawson, 23 October 1948.
Of Dutch or German Ancestry?

51 MHC Board of Colonization 1325/957, C. F. Klassen to William T. Snyder, 28 January 1953.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., William T. Snyder to George L. Warren, 28 January 1953.
54 I have spoken to many former refugees. When asked whether, during the war, they thought of themselves as Volksdeutsche or as citizens of Dutch ancestry, they invariably replied "as Volksdeutsche." Many, however, qualified that with a further statement that they did not approve of some of the racist policies of the German occupation forces. But many also admitted that their suffering under, and hatred of, the Soviet system made it natural for them to collaborate with the occupation forces and even to join German military units since Hitler and his government seemed absolutely determined to destroy the hated Soviet and communist system.
56 The "hard core" cases are discussed in Epp, Mennonite Exodus, ch. 26.
57 C. F. Klassen, "Die mennonitischen Flüchtlinge und wir," Der Mennonit, 1 Jahrgang (September/Oktober 1948), p. 84-86.