The 1979 MCC Canada Master Agreement for the Sponsorship of Refugees in Historical Perspective

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Introduction

This paper begins with a brief personal account relating to the negotiation of the Master Agreement (M.A.) between Mennonite Central Committee Canada (MCCC) and the Government of Canada for the private sponsorship of refugees. The paper then seeks to place this agreement in an historical context by exploring: whether there are historical precedents for private sponsorship; how changes in Canada’s immigration laws made such an agreement a logical next step; why MCCC, acting on behalf of the Canadian Mennonite people, was the first national church body to sign such an agreement; and how the M.A. looks in hindsight.

Regarding the personal account, I was privileged to have a role in those negotiations which took place early in 1979. I had been instructed by colleagues in MCCC’s Winnipeg head office to arrange a meeting with senior Immigration officials to look for better mechanisms for bringing in refugees from Southeast Asia, whose tragic situation was filling the news at this time. The officials were most open. The meeting took place on January 9, 1979. The Assistant Deputy Minister, Cal Best, chaired it. With him were Kirk Bell and Gordon Barnett. On our side were John Wieler, Arthur Driedger, Robert Koop, Don Friesen and I. In that meeting we sketched the outline of an agreement. Gordon Barnett and I were then asked to write it up. We met three or four times within the next few weeks, always checking with our respective colleagues. But things came together quickly. The agreement was formally approved by the MCCC Executive Committee in a telephone conference on February 14 and signed in the Winnipeg MCC offices on March 5 by our Executive Director, J. M. Klassen, and the Minister of Immigration, the Hon. Bud Cullen.

The agreement runs to eleven pages but its essence is simple. It arose from the fact that the new Immigration law, which came into
force in April 1978, contained a provision – in section 6(2) in the Act and section 7 in the Regulations – whereby any five individuals could sponsor a refugee if they accepted full liability for the refugee and his or her accompanying dependents for one year. Many people, though interested, were afraid of this liability. What would they do in a worst case scenario? With the M.A., MCCC accepted this liability. As a result, local groups, or congregations, if they obtained a letter of authorization from MCCC, did not have to worry about being liable. Also, if congregations obtained such letters, then Immigration officials did not have to screen them to see if they were reliable. The M.A. also spelled out what MCCC would do, what the government would do, how communications would flow between the congregations and local Immigration offices and with the Embassies abroad, etc. Once the M.A. was signed Mennonite congregations across Canada got to work with exceptional energy and commitment. Also, within weeks most of the other national church bodies had signed virtually identical M.As.

Precedents for the Private Sponsorship of Refugees
The negotiations for this agreement would not have proceeded so quickly if the context had not been receptive to it. One element in this context is that there were precedents for the idea of private sponsorship. Both the government of Canada and MCCC – the latter through its organizational predecessors – had experience with it. But that history was uneven, as the following review of eight refugee movements shows. (It can be noted that though the term ‘refugee’ was widely used, it did not have its own standing in Canadian law until the 1960s.)

First, in the 1920s, 21,000 Mennonites from the Soviet Union came to Canada under arrangements that amount to private sponsorship. The Order-in-Council of June 2, 1922, allowing them to enter, required existing Mennonite communities in Canada to ensure that the newcomers would be cared for, that none would become a burden on the public, and that they would become settled on agricultural land. These conditions may seem strict, but it should be remembered that a 1919 Order-in-Council had barred Mennonites from immigrating into Canada. That Order was now overturned because of the lobbying of Canadian Mennonite leaders and because Prime Minister McKenzie King had a soft spot for Mennonites, having grown up in the Kitchener-Waterloo area. Unfortunately, in 1929 Canada’s doors closed again, with horrific consequences for some ten thousand Mennonites waiting in Moscow.

After the Second World War, another 7,800 Mennonite refugees from Europe were admitted, again under a private sponsorship
arrangement. At first the government’s priority was to help returning soldiers. But Canadians with ethnic or religious connections among the refugees in Europe – some 30 million in total – began to lobby for their admission. According to the historian Ted Regehr, Canadian Mennonites were among the most effective lobbyists. In June 1946 the government approved a system whereby Canadians with close relatives in the refugee camps could sponsor them. Before long the “close relative” condition was broadened but it remained a “named sponsorship” program. The numbers grew rapidly. Mennonite workers in Europe, like those of other denominations, gathered names of people in the camps and urged their people in Canada to undertake sponsorships.

In 1956 a third group came when the Soviet Union crushed the uprising in Hungary and over 200,000 Hungarians fled to Austria. Canada accepted 37,500. At first the government wanted to rely primarily on private sponsorship, but appeals from churches, newspapers, and all opposition parties soon led it to take a more direct and more substantial role. The government would select those to be admitted and it would bring them over, but Canadian voluntary groups had a substantial role. Two-thirds of the newcomers were Catholic and some 13,000 Canadian Catholic families opened their homes to them. Another portion were Jewish and Canadian Jewish families welcomed them in a similar way. Other Canadian organizations were active too. It was not sponsorship but the involvement of private groups was substantial. Many of these newcomers were well educated so it was not long before they were on their own.

A fourth moment in Canada’s refugee history occurred in June 1959 when a UN designated “World Refugee Year” (WRY) began. It was to arouse new energy for dealing with the “hard cases” still lingering in the post-WWII camps in Europe, many because of Tuberculosis. Canada’s initial response was to give financial support to the UNHCR rather than to take people. Officials pointed out that Canada had taken a large number of Hungarians. Before long the government set up a private sponsorship program for close relatives. Soon, this was broadened. Also, the government agreed to admit 100 T.B. cases to be treated at public expense, in part because Ontario eased its social assistance regulations. This number was soon doubled and then tripled, meaning that 300 T.B. sufferers were admitted, together with 500 of their dependents. Interestingly, many recovered so quickly that less than one-third of the money set aside for their treatment was needed. The government also decided to keep open the special sponsorship provisions after the WRY. As a result over 7000 were admitted under these provisions in the next four years.

A fifth group came in 1968 when Soviet forces put down a pro-democracy movement in Czechoslovakia. At this time Canada
accepted 11,000 refugees. The government selected those to be admitted; it covered their transportation and this time it also provided language training, job training, even housing in some cases. We can assume that volunteers at the community level were active in helping the newcomers to get settled but their involvement does not represent private sponsorship. Again, many of the newcomers were well educated. They soon became established.  

A sixth wave arrived in 1972 when the Ugandan government of Idi Amin forced out the Asians, most of whom had lived there since early colonial times and had contributed substantially to the economy. Canada accepted 4000 of these displaced persons. Again, the government selected those to be admitted and provided support for them. It set up twelve centres in different parts of Canada to help the newcomers with housing, jobs, schools, etc. Local volunteers worked in these centres but, again, there was no private sponsorship program.  

In the late 1960s and early 70s, Canada admitted a large influx, the seventh, consisting of some 100,000 young Americans who, in a sense, were refugees from war. Some churches lobbied to keep Canada’s door open. It was not a matter of seeking special arrangements but, rather, a matter of ensuring that the regular immigration criteria were not tightened for draft-age Americans. A few church groups did a lot to help these newcomers with practical settlement needs, as did some other organizations, but many of these newcomers managed on their own, conditions in Canada being similar to those in the US. There was no sponsorship program.  

Finally, in 1973, after the coup in Chile, Canadian churches, following requests from churches in Chile, lobbied the Canadian government to admit people imprisoned by the new Chilean government. Canada was reluctant, perhaps because of a desire not to offend the US. When the Canadian government finally agreed to admit a small number of “political prisoners”, Canadian church representatives, together with their Chilean counterparts, were involved in selecting those most in need. In other words, there was significant church involvement but not a private sponsorship program.

This survey of eight refugee movements is not exhaustive. There were others. From 1870 to 1930, some 80,000 orphan children, many from London’s infamous east end, were sent to Canada, usually to farm families. In the 1960s Canada admitted a small number of Jews from Tunisia and Morocco, helped by the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society (JIAS) of Canada, though the 1939 refusal of a ship full of Jews from Nazi Germany is also on Canada’s record. In the mid-1970s when civil war broke out in Lebanon, Canada set up a small program to admit people from that country, while Lebanese families
already in Canada took care of their settlement needs. This survey is not exhaustive but it is sufficient to demonstrate that there was substantial private sponsorship in Canada long before the 1979 Master Agreement. The survey also shows that private sponsorship is not the only way of bringing refugees to Canada, nor the only way whereby voluntary groups can be involved in refugee work.

Changes in the Legal Framework in the Years Before the Agreement

A number of legal changes in Canada’s immigration and refugee framework in the fifteen years preceding the Master Agreement also contributed to the context for this Agreement. Three changes were made in 1967, following a 1966 White Paper. One involved the official removal of race, religion and nationality as factors in the selection of immigrants, including refugees. This change was in keeping with the world-wide decolonization and anti-discrimination movements of the time. Now, applicants would be assessed on the basis of a point system designed to determine how they would contribute to the Canadian economy and adjust to Canadian society. (Independent applicants had to have the highest number of points. Applicants in the “nominated relative” category could qualify with a lower number and those in the”family class” did not need any points.) The importance of immigration for the economy was reflected also in the government’s creation of a new department called, “Manpower and Immigration.” At this time the government also projected significant immigration increases and it committed itself to assisting newcomers in various practical ways.

A second change related specifically to refugees. The government acknowledged its responsibility for alleviating international refugee needs and indicated its intention to admit at least a modest number on an annual basis, not just in emergencies, including some “hard cases”. Further, it would sign the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and thereby accept the UN definition of a refugee, namely, someone who is outside of his or her country and who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted, if forced to return to that country, on any of the following grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion. (This appears to be the first time that the term “refugee” was used in Canadian law. Until this point the people who were popularly called refugees had been admitted as immigrants, albeit on the basis of special criteria.) By signing the UN Convention, Canada also agreed that it had an obligation to consider people if they came to Canada and made claims to be refugees according to that UN definition. The exact nature of that obligation was hotly debated in later years.
A third change related to the role of the churches. The government removed the question of people’s religious or denominational affiliation from immigration application forms.\textsuperscript{18} This forced a change in the role of churches. For generations churches had had chaplains at Canada’s seaports. They would meet incoming ships and welcome people who belonged to their church whom they would then assist in various practical ways. With this change it would no longer be possible to so identify people belonging to particular churches. However, following extensive discussions, eighteen religious groups (seventeen Christian and one Jewish) formed the National Interfaith Immigration Committee (NIFIC) to which the government would send lists of all immigrants including refugees. NIFIC’s central office would then send out the lists to local committees across the country that would then visit the newcomers in their area and give them information about local services, including religious services, as well as other help if necessary.\textsuperscript{19}

In the mid-1970s there was another series of changes. They started in 1973 when the Minister announced a comprehensive review as a first step toward a new national immigration policy. He spoke in terms of a great national dialogue. The churches were interested and their newly formed Inter-Church Project on Population (ICPOP) received a $50,000 grant from the government to contribute to this dialogue.\textsuperscript{20} At this time the question of over-population also became prominent in part because of the UN Conference on Population held in Budapest in 1974 and because the Science Council of Canada published a study which predicted a high-tech economic order for Canada for which a large population might not be helpful. The concern about over-population led the government to cut immigration substantially. The ICPOP disagreed. It followed the Parliamentary Committee in its hearings across Canada and argued, with passion and persistence, that if there was a bad fit between people and the economic order then the economic order should be changed and that instead of cutting immigration it should be expanded, particularly for refugees.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1978, after an extensive national dialogue, a new Immigration Act came into force. Regarding refugees, it affirmed that Canada had an international responsibility both in general and more specifically under the UN Convention. This Act also included a “designated class” provision whereby the government could identify a group of people and admit them as refugees even if they did not meet the UN definition. Further, it provided the authority for private sponsorship, namely, the five person concept noted above. It also required the government to present an annual plan to Parliament indicating the number of immigrants and refugees it planned to admit.

In a recent conversation, several officials who worked in the Immigration Department at that time said they had not known what to
expect from the private sponsorship provision. They had just felt that it would be good to have the Act, to be used if necessary. In the past, they said, Canada had too often responded on the basis of “ad hoc” arrangements. Now, by having provisions for “private sponsorship” and provisions for establishing “designated classes” in the law the Immigration department would be better equipped.\textsuperscript{22}

The inclusion of these provisions was timely, perhaps providential. Within a few months the crisis of the Southeast Asian boat people loomed large. Now the government acted quickly to make them a “designated class”, meaning that they were eligible for sponsorship. The M.A.s made that sponsorship work much easier. Though not contemplated at the time, such M.A.s were logical in the context of that new legal framework.

\textbf{MCCC and the Master Agreement}

Why did MCCC act quickly to sign a Master Agreement to ease the way for private sponsorship work? Why was MCCC the first to do so? And why did MCCC act on its own rather than jointly with other church bodies? Seven comments may shed light on these questions and yield a further understanding of the context. First is that the Canadian Mennonite people, for whom MCCC was a primary agency, had a substantial history of being refugees and doing sponsorship work. A number of individuals on the boards of the provincial and national MCCs had been refugees, as had thousands of people in the churches. The daily television reports and the teaching in the churches about caring for people in need compelled them to seek a response - one that would be immediate and direct.

A second reason why MCCC acted is that by this time the Canadian Mennonite people, through MCC, had a history with Vietnam. They had supported work in Vietnam since 1954. The decade of war involving the Americans had raised difficult issues for their churches. Was MCC too political? Was MCC too critical of the US and of its support for South Vietnam’s resistance to the communist north? Should all US draft resisters be welcomed in Canada? After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, MCC continued to provide assistance, being almost the only western agency to do so. Indeed, the Vietnamese Embassy in Ottawa became a vital contact point for this work. Now, with the refugees fleeing Vietnam, a different response seemed to be called for. This response may have resonated particularly with those Canadian Mennonites who felt that MCC leaders, disproportionately based in the US, had under-estimated the hardships of communist rule.

A third reason for the MCCC response is that it was natural for Mennonite people to see the church as a corporate social actor. This
view of the church grew out of both their history and their theology. For them to be a Christian meant being part of a church, and church was more than a place for weekly worship. It was a body that could act in society. As they saw things, the church was not totally separate from society, nor was it only the conscience of society, nor only an advocate urging the government to act. It could act on its own. Private refugee sponsorship was one more way for their churches to do so. It should be noted that the Christian Reformed Church also developed a very strong record on private sponsorship, based on their view of the church as a corporate social actor. Though not totally absent in other Christian traditions, this idea took a different form there.

A fourth reason why MCCC moved quickly is that at this time it had significant confidence in its relations with the government. It had received CIDA funds since 1968, being among the first Canadian NGOs to do so. It had just completed negotiations with CIDA for what would soon be called the Canadian Foodgrains Bank. To an extent that US Mennonites have often found difficult to understand, Canadian Mennonites tended to see their government as a partner in “doing good”. This close relationship with the government was not entirely new. In the post WWII resettlement of Mennonite refugees from Europe, there was very extensive interaction with the government. This had also been the case in the 1870’s when Mennonites from Russia settled in Manitoba. One aspect in the latter case involved the “Swiss” Mennonites in Ontario providing guarantees so that the federal government would lend substantial amounts of money to the new settlers in the West. So there were precedents. Still, the 1970s represented a high point in MCCC’s comfort with and confidence in its relations with the federal government.

Fifthly, it should be asked, why did Canadian Mennonites not respond in this way to earlier refugee crises like those involving Hungarians in 1956, Czechoslovakians in 1968, or Ugandan Asians in 1972? What was different about the 1979 Southeast Asian boat people crisis? Some of the preceding comments relate to these questions but a few additional words can be ventured. (i) Canadian Mennonites now had their own national agency, namely MCCC, accompanied by well-established provincial counterparts. (ii) At this time these organizations were blessed with some outstanding leadership people. (iii) By this time the Canadian Mennonite people were no longer as burdened with their own needs, meaning that they had resources that could be tapped. (iv) Thanks to television, the needs of the world now had a greater immediacy. (v) It seemed that no other community in Canada was stepping forward. Perhaps none had such a history of relations with Southeast Asia.

A sixth reason why the negotiations moved quickly is that the M.A. served the interests of the government. Most governments, at least
in the West, have humanitarian elements, reflecting the societies which they govern. In this case there was growing public pressure on the Canadian government “to do something.” Signing a M.A. for the private sponsorship of refugees was a relatively easy way for the government to respond. This is not to downplay the enormous work that government officials did, putting in thousands of extra hours. At a personal level, the motivation of many officials was not second to that of anyone on the church side. Still, involving the churches in private sponsorship made things easier for the government than if it had tried to do all this refugee work by itself. The government’s willingness to sign a M.A. included an element of self-interest.

Finally, it should be asked, why did MCCC not act together with other churches when it entered into negotiations for that first M.A.? One reason why MCCC acted alone is that it was not at that time as involved with other churches as it would be in subsequent years. But it can also be noted that some administrators in other churches had indicated reservations about the idea of private sponsorship, seeing it as a way of allowing the government to “off-load” its responsibility onto churches and other voluntary organizations. Other church administrators expressed uneasiness about the generosity being extended to Southeast Asians fleeing left-wing governments, in light of the hesitancy, a few years earlier, to accept Chileans fleeing a right wing government. Also, the other churches did not have the Mennonites’ substantial history with sponsorship or their twenty-five year involvement with Vietnamese people. Despite the differences, within weeks most other churches had signed identical agreements and begun sponsorship work. Soon after signing the M.A., MCCC joined the new Inter-Church Committee on Refugees and cooperated with other churches on a number of refugee issues.

Private Sponsorship in Light of Subsequent Developments

Numbers are not the only measure, but they should be noted. Reportedly, some 35,000 refugees came into Canada under the private sponsorship provision in the first eighteen months. The energy of the private sponsorship groups also prodded the government to substantially increase the number that it sponsored. Further, the involvement of the churches in the sponsorship of refugees probably strengthened their support for newcomer work in general. Mennonites, before long, had sizeable newcomer centres in a number of Canada’s cities. This involvement may also have increased support for MCC’s work with Low German newcomers.

It must also be acknowledged that, although the number of privately sponsored refugees was high at first, it fell quickly. From 1981 to 1986, the average annual number was around 5,000. Later in
the 1980s the numbers rose again, reaching 20,000 in 1989, mainly because of situations in El Salvador and Poland. In the last ten years the privately sponsored number has been just over 3,000 per year. Still, from 1979 to 2004, meaning the first twenty five years, approximately 185,000 refugees have been admitted to Canada under private sponsorship arrangements. Approximately 250,000 have come as government sponsored refugees, though churches and other private groups were involved with many of these as well, particularly with those who came under the Joint Assistance program. Over the years another large number have come to Canada via the inland claimant system.

Also to be noted is that after a few years certain issues emerged. One relates to the question of “named” sponsorships. When the program began most of the refugees being sponsored were “un-named,” meaning that they were selected by Canadian visa officers working in overseas settings. Before long, however, the first arrivals wanted to have their relatives and family members brought over. They would then request their sponsoring group to ask for those particular individuals. This desire for family reunification was understandable but it raised the question of balancing “named” and “un-named” sponsorship work, with people in the latter category sometimes not having anyone to advocate for them.

A second issue related to long processing times. At first, when most of those being sponsored were in Southeast Asia and when the government had a good number of visa officers there, the processing times were short. Later, when applications were for people in scattered parts of the world and when visa officers were not so readily available, the processing times became extended, sometimes to a year or even two years. The delays complicated things not only for sponsoring groups who had to arrange housing, collect furniture, and line up volunteers, but also for the refugees whose family or health situation might change so as to affect their admissibility, requiring them to repeat medical tests and other parts of the application process.

A third issue related to what sponsoring groups felt was inconsistent decision-making, high refusal rates, and the absence of a procedure for appealing refusals. A fourth was whether people’s “ability to become established” was being allowed to outweigh their “need for protection”. This related not only to those in danger of persecution but also to those with disabilities and health conditions, though the Joint Assistance Program, included in the original M.A. was helpful for the latter. A fifth issue related to how decisions were made to establish “designated classes” and how to lift such designations. This issue surfaced in the late 1980s when the UN proposed that the camps in Southeast Asia be closed, meaning also that private sponsorship from there would end. It is noteworthy that MCC supported this UN
These and other issues led to substantial consultations between government officials and Sponsorship Agreement Holders (SAHs), as the M.A. holders came to be known. In 1990 the government undertook a comprehensive review of the private sponsorship program, inviting substantial input from the SAHs. This review led to recommendations for changes on both the government’s side and the sponsoring groups’ side. In 1994 the government set up a joint NGO-Government committee to work further on these and other issues. That committee is still working and to date MCCC has always been represented on it.

Are There Broader Challenges?

Certainly, the Agreement stands as an arrangement whereby Mennonites have been able to do what they felt divinely called to do, namely, to give shelter to the homeless, safety to the persecuted, and refuge to the needy. But at a certain level Mennonites know that the divine call is broader, that it is to make this world such that all people can live – and live with some dignity. In this broader task, resettling refugees is only one element. Addressing the factors that cause people to become refugees is of vital importance. Still, the fact is that millions of people are refugees. What is the call in relation to them?

Sometime ago a Canadian official talked about the big concentrations of refugees in some parts of the world where they exist year after year with no solution in sight. She explained that the Canadian government was looking for a way to persuade the world to take another look at these situations. She felt that if Canada, helped by private sponsorship groups, would take even a small number of the hard cases, then it might be possible to persuade other countries to also open their doors. Perhaps, then, countries far away would take in key groups while those close by, with suitable international assistance, would allow others to become integrated into their own populations.

This official’s outline of a grand plan is challenging. In such an initiative MCCC would do its private sponsorship work in close partnership with the government which, in turn, would work in close partnership with other governments. Perhaps, by fulfilling their role in such a broader partnership, Canadian Mennonites would respond to a much larger number of those who are homeless, persecuted and in need.
Notes

1 This paper was presented at the conference, “Mennonite Hosts and Refugee Newcomers: 1979 – the Present”, sponsored by the Chair of Mennonite Studies, University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September 30, 2005.

2 John Wieler was responsible for MCCC’s Overseas Services and Art Driedger for coordinating refugee resettlement work in Canada. Both worked in our Winnipeg offices. Robert Koop was my assistant. Don Friesen, minister of the Ottawa Mennonite Church, came as a personal friend. That church, under Don’s continuing leadership, has sponsored more refugees in the following 27 years, than any other Mennonite church in Ontario.


8 Frank H. Epp, *Your Neighbour As Yourself: A Study on Responsibility in Immigration* (Winnipeg: Mennonite Central Committee Canada, 1968), 103.


10 Ibid., 233.

11 Ibid., 238.


13 The author’s September 15, 2005 conversation with George Cram, who was on the staff at Anglican Church of Canada in the 1970s.


16 MCCC contributed to the discussion of immigration issues at this time by sponsoring the 144 page book, *Your Neighbour As Yourself*, written by Frank Epp.

17 Ibid., 80, and Dirks, *Canada’s Refugee Policy*, 228.

18 Ibid., 80.

19 MCCC was a member of the NIFIC. The author chaired the local committee in Ottawa for five years in the early 1970s.


21 The author’s September 15, 2005 conversation with Bernard Daly who was on the staff of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and active in ICPOP in the 1970s.

22 The author’s conversations with Mike Molloy and Gordon Barnett, September 19, 2005, and with Cal Best, September 12, 2005. All three were senior government refugee officials.

23 This account of divergence among the churches draws on the conversations noted in preceding footnotes with George Cram, Bernard Daly, Gordon Barnett, Mike Molloy and Cal Best and on a September 30, 2005 conversation with John Wieler.


25 In the 1980s, the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, as Minister of Immigration, used the power of ‘designating classes’ to bring several thousand political prisoners from El Salvador to Canada.